CHAPTER 1
What Is Feminist Peace?

INTRODUCTION

Less than a year after the dropping of the first atomic bombs, 200 women from thirteen countries gathered in Luxembourg to hold a postwar meeting; a similar meeting had taken place in Zürich almost 40 years earlier, following the First World War. Just as with the previous time, North American women stared in disbelief at the devastation the war had caused to their European friends’ bodies and spirits. And, like that first time, they looked in vain for friends lost to the conflict, with a heightened awareness of human beings’ capacity for destruction. At the 1919 Zürich meeting, they had been disillusioned about statesmen’s willingness and ability to keep the peace but remained determined to raise their voices as women to prevent another such conflict. They decided to formally constitute the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), a women’s peace organization, to accomplish this task.

At the 1946 meeting in Luxembourg, they wondered whether an organization like WILPF still had a purpose. They wondered if the words they had used to express their ideals of “freedom, democracy, justice, equality, peace . . . [had] been abused and degraded to such an extent that these words [had] become hollow shams.”1 They wondered whether, as women, they had a role to fulfill in the pursuit of peace. French delegates recounted their experiences of Nazi occupation and concluded that peace had no meaning without freedom, that death was better than slavery, and that war was better than servitude.2 Like their Dutch friends, the French women had participated in the armed resistance alongside men. Danish and Finnish women, too, had lived under occupation, yet they had opted for nonviolent resistance and humanitarian and relief work. In neutral and unoccupied Sweden, WILPF women had
focused on educational and humanitarian efforts. They had also worked on their visions for the future, launching a movement in favor of the United Nations (UN), which later became the Swedish branch of the United Nations Association.\textsuperscript{5} The German delegates were denied travel documents, but they had already reconstituted chapters in the Allied-occupied zone and let their friends know of their intention to work to “make the word ‘German’ honorable again.”\textsuperscript{4} Quite a few WILPFers had perished in concentration camps or at the hands of the Nazi army. Others had arrived at the Congress against many odds and nearly starving.

Their concrete experience of wartime suffering made it compellingly urgent for them to figure out how to prevent such suffering and destruction from ever happening again. Their organization was born out of the social work and suffrage movements of the progressive era and was founded on the principles of liberal internationalism. In Luxembourg, they recognized the tension between their prewar liberal ideals and those ideals’ inability to prevent the Holocaust. Yet the women still believed that they had to find some ground on which to build the possibility of eliminating human suffering and annihilation. Overwhelmingly, they voted to continue the organization and immediately started deliberations on postwar planning for a future of peace.

The women who met in Luxembourg in 1946 were peace activists. Their discussions highlight that, as activists, they were thinking theoretically about how to reconcile their belief in peace with their identities and roles as women, with their lived experiences of the war, and with the realization that their ideology had failed to prevent World War II. These women peace activists were theorists who, in the course of that debate and in the years that followed, tried to bring forth a theoretical vision of peace that would sit on more solid ground, while at the same time working to realize it in practice. They were mostly liberal activists who were questioning the extent to which their liberalism had failed them and the world, and wondering on what other ideological foundations they could draw to design a more solid peace. They were Western activists who had suffered conquest and were thinking about the dissonance between peoples’ freedom and an occupier’s “peace.” They were women activists who were wondering whether women had some different theoretical and practical contributions to make to peace, thinking about what linked women’s freedom to world peace, and reflecting on the relationship between militarism and their suffrage and feminist work.

In the years that followed, WILPF wrestled with these questions and, in the process, reformulated its ideas about peace. Its story can help us make sense of the practical dilemmas and theoretical struggles of peace activists.
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in the postwar West. These activists participated in the reconstruction following the Second World War, despite skepticism of the ideological and political bases on which such reconstruction was being pursued. From their story, today’s feminists can draw lessons for their own theoretical reflections on peace and its relationship to feminism and women. Finally, their story can help us understand how organizations and social movements expand the boundaries of the ideological and historical milieu in which they are situated and open up possibilities for emancipatory social change. The case of WILPF’s postwar policies on peace offers an important opportunity to explore to what extent and how the organization overcame deeply entrenched assumptions and transformed its understanding of “peace.”

In this book I reformulate the relationship between feminism, international relations (IR), and peace studies. Because feminist IR theorists have found the contention that women are more peaceful than men problematic, they have too often eschewed theoretical engagement with peace studies and peace research. On the other hand, IR has sidelined its original preoccupation with peace as both an empirical goal and a theoretical ideal. Thus, this project aims at making feminist peace theorizing once again part of the wider context of (feminist) IR by exploring the possibility of a feminist theory of emancipatory social change.

PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES

The discipline of IR was born in the aftermath of World War I out of a need to prevent war from breaking out again. Despite this, IR theory has not developed theoretical accounts of peace. Oliver Richmond contends that, although peace “was explicitly part of the institutional frameworks of the modern era,” IR theory tends to deal with peace only implicitly. He finds that different conceptions of peace underlie the different approaches to IR. The interwar idealist literature offered a normative, ethically oriented account of peace. As a precursor to contemporary liberalism, this literature claimed that reason and international law and institutions could enable mutual cooperation and bring about lasting peace, defined as the absence of all interstate violence.

Following the outbreak of the Second World War, the disillusionment with this ideal of peace, which had been partially realized in interwar international institutions, is often credited with shifting the discipline’s focus toward realism. In realist accounts, peace was conceived negatively as the absence of war and viewed as an anomaly in an international system always
potentially at war. According to both classical and structural realists, in an anarchical international system, states pursue self-interest (understood as power maximization) and the best that can be achieved is a fragile balance of power of temporary stability in between wars. Believing otherwise was not only naïve; it was also dangerous. An idealist peace was unattainable in practice and as a concept not very useful for understanding the workings of the international system.

Though realism became the predominant approach to IR theory during the Cold War, other approaches, which proposed their own visions of peace, coexisted with it. Marxist approaches, for example, introduced the idea of peace as economic justice and social emancipation, sometimes achievable only after revolutionary upheaval. Varieties of liberalism and pluralism saw peace as a consequence of the institutionalization of universal liberal norms of global governance and international cooperation. In general, however, peace was not theorized explicitly except within the subdiscipline of peace studies, which also emerged after the Second World War.

The impetus for peace studies came first from the dangers that the invention and deployment of the atomic bomb foretold. In response, peace research (or peace science, as it was also known) devoted itself to the prevention of interstate war and to issues of arms control and disarmament (especially nuclear disarmament). But peace studies’ emergence can also be seen as a reaction to “the domination of the discipline of IR by what many peace and conflict researchers saw as a self-fulfilling militaristic paradigm obsessed with power and violence, interest and status.” 8 Though marginalized within IR, peace studies has introduced concepts that have been widely utilized in international relations, such as the distinction between structural and direct violence and between positive and negative peace. Moreover, it has contrasted with the IR tendency to value the role and agency of individuals less than “grand scale political, economic, military, social and constitutional peace projects undertaken beyond the ken and capacity of the individual.” 9

By attributing equal importance to individuals’ agency and their role in bringing about peace, peace studies has blurred the distinction between activism and scholarship. Since its beginnings, peace studies has drawn inspiration from nonviolent movements, such as Gandhian nonviolent mobilizations in South Africa and India and the antinuclear movement. 10 This, together with the field’s normative agenda and its commitment to transdisciplinarity, make peace studies congenial to feminism. However, although feminists have historically made significant contributions to the theory and practice of peace, peace studies has marginalized issues central to feminist concerns. Rarely do nonfeminist peace studies scholars engage
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in conversations with feminism or take into serious consideration feminist assertions that gender relations of power are implicated in conflict and peace processes.

PEACE, GENDER, AND FEMINIST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Feminism encompasses scholarship or activism that starts from the lives of women and makes visible and subverts gendered relations of power in society. Feminists define gender as a socially and symbolically constructed dichotomy, based on perceived or real biological sex differences, that underlies the creation and reproduction of social relations of power. Gender, as a power relation, shapes and naturalizes other social relations of power by assigning them to mutually exclusive categories of super/subordination to each other. When people see the social world in terms of binary opposites, such as public/private, rational/emotional, objective/subjective, or active/passive, they reproduce the masculine/feminine pair and the relationship of subordination mapped into it, where “the first, masculine, term is generally valued over the second, feminine, term.” In reality, these dichotomies obscure more complex relationships and naturalize both gender differences and the superiority in social life of attributes associated with the masculine.

Feminists argue that gender relations of power are implicated in the social construction of violence and war. Framing violence and war in opposition to nonviolence and peace is a gendered move that reproduces the male/female hierarchical relation into the social realm and, with it, the superior standing of violence over nonviolence. When realists described “peace” in negative terms as absence of war and labeled it as “idealistic,” “passive,” and “utopian,” they were in fact gendering the notion (and practice) of peace as feminine and delegitimizing it. Feminists have joined a number of peace researchers in observing that, rather than being a passive concept, peace is a very destabilizing notion, because it aims at subverting the status quo. Despite this common assertion, peace studies has failed to adequately look at how the concept of peace is gendered, to study the ways in which women and men are differently affected by the presence or absence of armed conflict, and to include women’s experiences and feminist reflections about peace in its analysis.

On the other hand, feminists have been divided over whether engaging with peace studies and theoretical questions about peace is useful or meaningful for feminism. Since the 1980s feminist debates on the relationship between feminism, peace, and women’s peace activism and scholarship have focused on one issue: whether, to what extent, and how women are
more peaceful than men. This debate has been inscribed in larger and older feminist conversations about whether, to what extent, how, and with what consequences women are like men or different from them. Some feminists think that feminist and peace projects are “natural” allies, because they both promote values and/or characteristics with which women are naturally or socially more endowed than men. Other feminists critique this assumption as perpetuating the same devaluation of both women and peace implied in realist thinking. They have argued that

The association of femininity with peace lends support to an idealized masculinity that depends on constructing women as passive victims in need of protection. It also contributes to the claim that women are naïve in matters relating to international politics.

As a consequence, feminist IR has rarely if ever engaged in theoretical questions about peace and gender. The reluctance on the part of many feminists to have their work associated with, or labeled as, peace research ironically ends up perpetuating this devaluation of peace and women. Yet, the many women who are engaged in social movements for peace force us to inquire into their vision of peace and their views about the relationship between peace and gender. The blurred boundaries between activism and research that are characteristic of much feminist and peace research confront us with questions of activists’ contributions to theorizing. Feminist scholars, either by being themselves activists or by cooperating with feminist movements, have deepened feminist activism’s self-reflection and sometimes efficacy through the development of regular (though not always friendly or sufficient) interactions between activists and scholars. This is true of women’s peace and antiwar movements too: Women peace activists have engaged in theoretical reflections on the relationship between their identities and roles as women and their peace activism for more than a century. Feminist IR should seize the opportunity to learn from their contributions to feminist peace theorizing.

This book takes on this challenge, and, in doing so, it shows that not only is feminist peace theorizing possible and necessary, but it has also been pursued by women peace activists for many years. In response to preoccupations about easy associations between women and peace, it intends to develop what Linda Forcey calls the “finely tuned appreciation” of both equality and difference, “a pragmatic tolerance for ambiguity and more than a little theoretical untidiness,” to reveal the complexities of arguments regarding women, feminism, and peace. I also intend to be reflective regarding what can be gained in IR by looking at peace from a feminist perspective,
how international politics can be influenced and changed by thinking and acting about peace as feminists, and why it is important to do so. Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King claim that "women peace organizing is strengthened and transformed through confrontation with feminist questions of gender." I contend that the reverse is equally true: Women peace activists offer strong theoretical contributions to the study of the relationship between gender, peace, and feminism that should be taken into account by feminist scholarship.

I trace the evolution of the policies of the oldest Western international women’s peace organization (WILPF), in three of its areas of work, in order to understand what ideas of peace informed them, how they changed, and what made the changes possible. I take into serious consideration the possibility that, in the practices of WILPF, peace studies, feminist IR, and the discipline of IR can find important theoretical contributions to the study of peace.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Different positions on the relationship between women, feminism, and peace have been present in WILPF since its inception. WILPF originated from an international gathering of women coming from several neutral and belligerent countries in 1915 during the First World War. Under the initiative of a number of US and European women with backgrounds in suffrage and social work, the women assembled in The Hague with the ambitious goal of stopping the war. Among them were prominent suffragists such as Aletta Jacobs and Rosa Manus from Holland, Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence from England, Rosika Schwimmer from Hungary, and Anita Augspurg from Germany. Jane Addams, the founder of the settlement house movement in the United States, traveled to The Hague together with Emily Greene Balch, who was at the time a professor of economics and sociology at Wellesley College (but was fired in 1918 because of her pacifist work). Addams and Balch were the first American women to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, in 1931 and 1946 respectively. The plan that the women drafted at The Hague meeting shares many similarities with Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen-Point postwar arrangement proposal of 1918, which (together with the establishment of the League of Nations) is viewed by some as an attempt to implement liberal ideals in the international realm. The Congress established two delegations that would travel to belligerent countries to present their case for the immediate cessation of hostilities and their plans for lasting peace: Between May and June 1915, seven
women visited fourteen governments urging them to end the war. Needless to say, the women’s initiatives did not stop the war, but they did lead to a second International Congress, held in Zürich, which gave birth to WILPF.  

In Zürich, Swiss delegate Clara Ragaz made the following observation:

> And even as we serve our country best in so far as we strive for its welfare incorporated in the greater good of humanity, so do we also best serve the cause of women by serving all mankind. It is a debatable question even among us women, whether the enfranchisement of women will in itself be a weapon for the prevention of future wars. But even if we may hold different opinions on that head, it seems to me that one thing is undeniable, that is that woman can only come into her full inheritance in a state, or a community life, which is founded not on force but on justice, for where mere force dominates, the lesser part will always fall to her share.

In this speech Ragaz presented three different views of the relationship between feminism and peace, which she thought were present among the women assembled in Zürich:

1. Women’s liberation itself will lead to peace.
2. Women’s liberation will not in itself bring peace but is one piece of the puzzle (possibly not the first priority for WILPF women).
3. Women’s full liberation will happen only in a world of justice and peace.

The distinctions that Ragaz raised were strategic and practical rather than purely theoretical distinctions between equality feminism and difference feminism in relation to peace. She did not ask whether women were more peaceful or peace-loving than men but rather how WILPF should pursue the equally important and perhaps related goals of women’s emancipation and peace. This heterogeneity of views underlined all decisions made at the Congress and during the subsequent years, although it would not always be made explicit.

Among the first acts of this Congress was a resolute condemnation of the Versailles Peace Treaty, together with a cautious optimism about the nascent League of Nations. The women found that the treaty terms could not lead to a “just and lasting peace” because they violated fundamental principles: They imposed unfair and unnecessary burdens on the losers while sanctioning the victors’ rights to the spoils of war; they denied the right of self-determination; and they imposed unilateral rather than universal disarmament, thus continuing to sanction the use of force in international
relations. The women predicted that such terms would only increase animosities, poverty, and despair, which would eventually lead to another catastrophic war. They urged Allied and associated governments to amend the treaty terms to be more in accordance with President Wilson’s Fourteen Points.

The founders intended WILPF to be a transnational organization, whose policies would be determined by consensus at the triennial International Congress, where, ideally, all national sections would be represented. Policies would then be carried out by an executive committee, if possible, in consultation with national sections that had relative autonomy regarding policy implementation. National sections were represented at the Congress by delegates elected domestically. WILPF’s official policies, statements, and various kinds of pronouncements were produced (and, in general, they still are) after extensive consultations among members. While stressing the centripetal character of the organization, where policies were created at the international level and implemented by each national section, national sections were encouraged to participate in the League’s decision-making process at different stages and in different forms (through study groups, committees, campaigns, etc.). Though individual sections could and did carry out humanitarian and activist work, the founders (and in particular Emily Greene Balch, its first international secretary) viewed relief as a distraction from WILPF’s primary political task of eliminating the causes of war. This was to be carried out through “the study of political and economic issues; objective fact-finding; personal reconciliation; and the formulation of just and humane policies.” National sections were expected to exercise political pressure on their governments and to approach government delegations at international conferences directly. The international office organized WILPF’s representation at these conferences and at the League of Nations (and later at the UN). It also set up fact-finding missions to travel to areas of conflict: For example, it was one of the first organizations to investigate the effects of the US occupation of Haiti in 1926, and in 1927 a WILPF delegation visited China and Indochina to assess the political situation and seek contacts with women’s groups.

During the 1930s WILPF was predominantly engaged in pushing for economic and arms embargoes and convening international peace conferences to counteract the rise of the fascist regimes and to prevent or stop the wars that broke out prior to World War II. Political differences came to the fore in the mid-1930s, when the French and German members clashed with British, US, and Scandinavian women over economic justice, the use of violence, and WILPF’s methods of work. On the one hand, the French and Germans favored more radical involvement in issues of social justice,
cooperation with mass movements, and the use of violence in response to injustice. Other groups prioritized nonviolence and the conviction that no one social order would lead to peace, arguing that "peace is a method and not a state and . . . under every system there will be causes for clash." 34 These disagreements are particularly significant because they have constituted a defining characteristic of WILPF since its origins. They surfaced time and again in later years, particularly during debates on revolutionary movements in the 1960s and 1970s, a point that will be made clear and analyzed in chapters 4 and 5. In fact, since its beginning, the organization has been composed of women with very different political views, united by the belief that warfare should be eliminated and that economic and social justice was part and parcel of a system of peace. Its members did not identify with pacifism, though many were pacifists; they did not identify with feminism, though many were feminist; some were guided by secular humanist principles, and some by a religious ethic (the Quaker and Jewish constituencies were particularly strong). They mostly belonged to the upper and middle class, and the vast majority of them were white.

The organization was, however, grounded in the principles of liberal internationalism. While there have been WILPF members who have described themselves as socialists, WILPF’s ideology and policies have generally reflected its founders’ faith in liberal ideals. WILPF’s principles, raisons d’être, and objectives were spelled out in their constitution and by-laws, which have changed relatively little throughout their existence. For WILPF, the preconditions and elements of a just peace centered on (a) freedom (loosely identified with the establishment of liberal democracy), (b) self-determination (an element of freedom), (c) total and universal disarmament, and (d) economic development and prosperity to satisfy human needs. WILPF’s ideal of peace thus rested on liberal ideals and on the essentially liberal belief in the institutionalization of liberal norms of social, political, and economic cooperation and governance, based on liberal values, shared norms, and legal frameworks that would guarantee the rights and needs of people. 35 But while their understandings of “peace” were embedded in (and thus defined and delimited by) the historical and ideological structure they inhabited, they were at the same time dynamic, as I will later show.

The Second World War put the organization in limbo, but even as it raged the women had started postwar planning, stressing the need for a stronger international organization, a human rights charter, “constructive measures of world co-operation to prevent aggression,” and a “new concept of ‘security,’ not based on military power and prestige.” 36 When they assembled in Luxembourg in 1946, however, their first debate centered on what kinds of contributions women could make to the cause of peace that would
be different from men’s; how and whether women should speak out, as women, in matters of war and peace; and whether a transnational women’s organization speaking for peace was relevant in a nuclear world. The vote for continuation did not imply that WILPF had resolved the issues that the debate had raised. In the years between 1945 and 1975, the organization was forced to reevaluate its role as an international women’s organization for the promotion of peace, in an international context that was itself in transition after the watershed of World War II, through the optimism of the early postwar years, the height of the Cold War, détente, the decolonization movement, the Vietnam war, and the resurgence of worldwide feminist organizing and networking. This book addresses the ways in which this ideological, political, and historical context intersected with WILPF’s debates and unstated assumptions about the role of women and feminism in international politics to produce different understandings of “peace.”

THE POSTWAR ORDER AND WILPF

Robert Latham calls the immediate aftermath of the Second World War a “liberal moment,” when the destruction of the old world order gave rise to an opportunity for the creation of a new one, within the macro-historical fabric of liberal modernity and with the hegemonic agency of the United States.37 Modernity, of course, did not emerge in the mid-1900s, but scholars alternatively characterize the time as “peak modernity”38 or “high modernity.”39 It saw liberalism join “visions of the planned transformation of society by rational scientific means”40 in the establishment of the UN, the codification of international law along the principles of liberal political thought, and the institutionalization of mechanisms of “embedded liberalism” in the economy.41

For postwar liberals, peace would be attainable through rational planning, organization, and institution building implemented by liberal states. A belief in progress and the power of rational norms and institutions to tame humanity’s primitive instincts was at the core of liberalism’s visions of peace. Economic, social, and scientific progress would eventually cause changes in the international system, which would induce peace. International institutions, multilateralism, and self-determination were seen as essential elements of the rational organization of the international system, as vehicles for the spread of the universal liberal values, norms, and rights so necessary to creating a peaceful international structure. Free markets and trade “would build up irrevocable and peaceful connections between states” by creating interdependence.42
But liberalism itself was multifaceted, composed of “a plurality of values” sometimes in tension with each other. 43 James Richardson points out that a “liberalism of the powerful,” while viewed as essentially benign and good for peoples all over the world, in reality sometimes involved the imposition of liberal “universal” values with little consideration for cultural and historical diversity and with equally little concern with the way power shaped interstate relations in a liberal world. 44 The postwar order was also characterized (at least in the West) by the hegemonic project of the United States, which, while being liberal, was not entirely benign. 45 The system created after the Second World War had both consensual and coercive dimensions, and it entailed “a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeate[d] a whole system of states and non-state entities.”46 Simultaneously, this “liberalism of privilege” coexisted with an “egalitarian, social, or inclusive” strand of liberalism. 47

WILPF, like other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the UN, and its agencies and liberal states operated within that system, which shaped practices and ideas in the international realm. 48 The postwar liberal order influenced and shaped the forms, purposes, and ideologies of the organizations that worked within that order. But because it was built on the unstable principles of modern liberalism, that order was also inherently contestable.

It is therefore important to understand whether, to what extent, and how Western organizations could challenge and redefine the parameters of the postwar liberal order, thereby expanding the boundaries of what was possible within it. Was WILPF, as a Western organization, founded on the principles of liberal internationalism, embedded in the hegemonic liberalism that characterized the postwar order, or was it an organization that expanded liberalism’s boundaries and its own? To the extent that it was a critical voice within the liberal order, what made it possible for it to be so? Answers to these questions have important implications beyond the confines of the geohistorical scope of this book. They can help us understand how individuals and groups can transcend ideological, historical, and structural limits and effect social change.

To this end, this book addresses the following questions: How did WILPF resolve questions about the relationship between women, feminism, and peace? Were its answers consistent through different historical circumstances, or did they vary along with the international context? If they varied, were different responses solely influenced by the external environment, or was something else at play? In other words, how did the historical, social, political, economic, and ideological context interact with WILPF women’s intentionality to determine different ideas about peace
and its relationship with feminism and/or women? Moreover, to the extent that their ideas and policies challenged, rather than reproduced, the ideological milieu in which they were situated and that defined them, what compelled, favored, or helped the organization in this move? Finally, what lessons can we learn from WILPF that might be relevant to actors interested in social change? In the next chapter, I use insights from both feminism and constructivism to address these questions. I argue that the possibility, extent, and kind of social change depend on actors’ methodology, whereby methodology I intend “guiding self-conscious reflections on epistemological assumptions, ontological perspective, ethical responsibilities, and method choices.” I also argue that, as a women’s organization not necessarily self-identified as feminist, WILPF practiced a feminist methodology that tended to subvert gendered relations of power in society and was, therefore, emancipatory.

**WILPF AND SOCIAL CHANGE**

WILPF is today the longest-living international Western women’s peace organization, with national sections on six continents. As an NGO, it was granted consultative status with the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council and a number of other UN agencies since the early postwar years. Through this status it has enjoyed a measure of communication with many national governments represented at the UN. WILPF today has a leading role in feminist peace advocacy internationally: Along with a number of other NGOs, it has been instrumental in bringing about UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security. In this sense, it is a “mainstream” NGO (i.e., not a radical social movement). In fact, at times, it has been considered “too mainstream” or entrenched in the postwar international system by organizations and social movements critical of this system. Yet it has also been considered “too radical” when its policies have challenged certain governments’ actions. It is an organization that navigates within the international system according to the parameters of liberalism, yet it is guided by principles, rules, and behaviors that are sometimes at odds with them.

While continuing to be faithful to its liberal internationalist origins, and being an organization composed primarily of middle- to upper-class white Western women, WILPF has evolved into a leading critic of militarism, racism, sexism, environmental destruction, and unfettered capitalism, emphasizing the connection between all forms of oppression and exclusion. As an insider to the liberal system, it is stretching its boundaries, thereby...
contributing to incremental emancipatory social change. Much of this transformation happened following both world wars and, in particular, during the thirty years after World War II. Yet this period has mostly eschewed the attention of feminist historians, who see feminism “in abeyance” prior to the reflowering of the late 1960s and 1970s. Yet women of WILPF carved externally oriented political spaces for themselves even within a hostile context and paved the way for subsequent feminist activism. In the process of carving such spaces, they also redefined the self-image of this important women’s organization. Learning how it made itself an agent of change can be of theoretical and practical help for understanding the possibilities of emancipatory agency.

I focus my attention on three areas of WILPF’s work: disarmament, decolonization, and the Middle East. The three areas have been central for WILPF in the post–WWII period, and disarmament and decolonization have been two of its most prioritized areas, especially since 1945. Because they intersect at times with other issues, they highlight to what extent and with what kinds of rationale WILPF chose to relate them (or not) to other issues. The development of atomic energy and the demise of colonial empires gave new impetus and provided the opportunity for the organization to offer input into decisions being made in the international arena. The conflict in Israel/Palestine was a newer topic of attention and rose to prominence only after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. This area of WILPF’s work represents a more grounded, more specific case that shows the overlap between disarmament and decolonization and with other areas of the organization’s work and sheds light on how ideas about peace translated practically in a specific geopolitical context. These three cases offer the opportunity to reflect on the relationship between ideas entrenched in a structural context and actors’ intentionality and ability to challenge that context. Specifically, they allow me to evaluate the extent to which WILPF’s practices pushed the boundaries of the ideological context that defined and limited their possibilities.

As for my own methodologies, I have adopted a combination of interpretive tools. I draw from an understanding of knowledge as situated, and I start with the assumption that “the only way of knowing in a socially constructed world is knowing it from within.” I employ grounded theory as immanent critique to use the organization’s own learning as a basis for making theoretical and practical claims about emancipatory agency. This translates into a historical narrative (interpretive process-tracing) that uses a mixture of archives and secondary sources to outline a storyline highlighting both continuities and discontinuities in WILPF’s ideologies and policies in context.
My interpretation focuses on four aspects of the sources used. (1) I seek to interpret the contextual meanings of policy positions, casting a wide archival net and examining the international WILPF’s resolutions, statements, official policy documents, all discussions, comments, notes, proceedings of international meetings, official and nonofficial correspondence, and reports in the areas covered. I use interviews as a cross-check to relate directly to those activists who were involved with major decisions. Unfortunately, only a few of those personalities are alive today (which points to important limits of my interpretation). Their memories have helped me to better capture debates and disagreements with regard to who said what and when, sharpen my interpretation, fill gaps, highlight different and important directions that I might have sidelined, and sometimes correct my own misinterpretations of some documents. (2) I use secondary sources such as biographies, historical works, and theoretical critiques to situate policies in the ideational and historical context in which they were adopted. (3) I am particularly concerned with tracing changes, disjunctures, and moments of transition in order to (4) uncover the methodological principles that underscored the production of policy decisions.

CONCLUSIONS

This book intends to be a contribution to IR theory on three fronts: (a) It reformulates the relationship between feminism, IR, and peace studies by situating feminist peace theorizing in feminist IR, from which it has been excluded; (b) it proposes a feminist methodology for emancipatory social change, which (c) moves forward the agent-structure problem in constructivist IR.

Chapter 2 introduces my theoretical framework: Starting with a discussion of feminist debates about peace, I outline their inadequacy for understanding WILPF’s own internal struggles. I then ground my analysis in a constructivist ontology of social construction and suggest the need to focus on methodology to develop a theory of emancipatory agency. After describing what feminists would require of such a theory, I summarize Brooke Ackerly’s Third World Feminist Social Criticism (TWFSC) as a point of departure. I highlight its contributions and potential for a theory of agency in IR. I suggest that its methodological tools need to be extended to encourage action in the direction of emancipation, in the context of defining and constraining structures.

Chapter 3 follows the policies of WILPF on disarmament from 1945 to 1975. I show that WILPF’s worldview about the causes of war, militarization,
the arms buildup, and its elimination went through two distinct phases: from an emphasis on legal and political agreements as first steps in making nuclear arms unnecessary, a focus on nuclear abolition, and an optimistic view of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to the articulation of a harsher economic critique of the war system. WILPF’s critique emphasized that the nuclear arms buildup, together with nuclear energy use and traffic in small arms, were cornerstones of an economic system based on profits rather than needs. Thus, between 1945 and 1975, WILPF constructed its idea of peace around different ideologies, each imbued with its own sets of gender assumptions. I argue that shifts in the international environment are not enough to understand how or why WILPF formulated different ideas and policies about peace as related to disarmament issues in the 1970s. I show that the international environment favored increasingly self-reflective practices, which led to the articulation of more far-reaching peace and disarmament arguments.

Chapter 4 follows WILPF’s policies on decolonization. I argue that an early 1970s resolution on the inevitability of violent revolutions, unprecedented until then, resulted from a shift in ideological beliefs. Though the international environment of the 1960s and 1970s favored this shift, WILPF arrived at its new policies thanks to an increasing reliance on feminist critical methods. I highlight the origins of the profound disagreements within the organization on this issue and the practices that allowed for their resolution.

Chapter 5 explores the policy shifts of WILPF on the long-standing international conflict in Israel/Palestine. In the mid-1970s, WILPF declared its support for a two-state solution, a peace conference under UN auspices, and the creation of a WMD (weapons of mass destruction)-free zone in the area. With that declaration, and increasingly in subsequent years, WILPF went from being timidly pro-Israel (1947–1974) to assertively questioning Israel’s policies, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the democratic nature of the Israeli state. I argue that WILPF leadership’s changing ideas about Arab women and their roles, identities, and cultural norms influenced a change in policy. This policy change occurred despite its unpopularity with some important constituencies, especially in the United States, indicating continuing contestations over the meaning of peace.

Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the empirical findings and assesses the extent to which Brooke Ackerly’s theory of TWFSC adequately represents WILPF’s methodology in the context of the postwar liberal West. Drawing on and expanding Ackerly’s theory, I outline a methodology for emancipatory social change in the context of the liberal West. A final epilogue briefly traces the development of WILPF’s policies after 1975, with particular attention to its participation in the global women’s movement until 2011.
NOTES

CHAPTER 1


6. I use the conventional description of this literature in calling it “idealist” with the awareness that the label was applied to it somewhat unfairly by self-described “realists” in the course of the so-called “first debate.” See Lucian M. Ashworth, “Did the Realist–Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations,” *International Relations* 16, no. 1 (April 2002), 33–51.


10. Johan Galtung, who is widely considered to be one of the founders of the field of peace studies, credits Gandhi for having inspired him to think about structural violence.


20. The literature on gender and conflict is, by contrast, very rich, and early feminist literature on gender and peace has greatly informed the international relations (IR) subfield of feminist security studies; see Annick Wibben, Feminist Security Studies: A Narrative Approach (New York: Routledge, 2011), 4–5.


26. A contentious point among historians is the extent to which Wilson was indeed influenced by the women’s plan. Jane Addams’s biographer Louise W. Knight falls short of making a connection between the two: She rather claims that six of Wilson’s Fourteen Points “were moderate versions of resolutions in the ICWPP’s [International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace] platform, which, as Wilson recognized, while having a good deal in common with many other peace platforms, was more complete.” See Louise W. Knight, Jane Addams: Spirit in Action (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010), 222–23. On the other hand, Wilson’s biographer John Cooper traces the Fourteen Points speech to a plan drafted by a “freestanding committee” of experts and modified by Edward House and Wilson himself. See John Milton Cooper, Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 421–23. Though Cooper never refers to the influence of peace.
groups on this committee or on Wilson, Liddington quotes Jane Addams reporting that Wilson said to her that the women’s congress “was by far the best formulation [of a peace plan] which up to the moment has been put out by anybody.” See Jill Liddington, The Road to Greenham Common: Feminism and Anti-Militarism in Britain since 1820 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 104.

27. J. L. Richardson, Contending Liberalisms in World Politics: Ideology and Power (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 63; Richmond, Peace in International Relations, 33. See also Cooper, Woodrow Wilson, 423.

28. For a fascinating and thorough insider’s account of the birth and history of WILPF up until 1965, see Bussey and Tims, Pioneers for Peace. This historical summary is largely derived from that volume; from Catherine Foster, Women for All Seasons: The Story of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989); and from Leila J. Rupp, Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).


30. Karen Garner similarly finds that Western women’s and feminist movements from 1925 to 1985 transcended the theoretical dichotomy between “equality” and “difference” feminism and, rather, “as circumstances demanded, employed various strategies to advance feminist empowerment.” See Karen Garner, Shaping a Global Women’s Agenda: Women’s NGOs and Global Governance (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2010), 4.

31. Bussey and Tims, Pioneers for Peace, 35.


33. As a result of that first fact-finding trip to China, urged support for the Kuomintang as the legitimate government of China on the ground that “Chiang Kai-Shek [was] definitely working with committees and cabinet and [was] trying to build up a civil Government.” See Edith Pye’s report in Bussey and Tims, Pioneers for Peace, 62.

34. Kathleen Innes, in Bussey and Tims, Pioneers for Peace, 121 (emphases in original).

35. Richmond, Peace in International Relations, 21–39. WILPF favored the strengthening of the League of Nations (and, since 1945, the United Nations), advocating for universality of membership, the establishment of machinery for international peace, and total and universal disarmament. It worked on the relationship between disarmament and economics, particularly viewing free trade as an incentive to international peace. It declared its opposition to all forms of imperialism and colonialism.

36. Message of the Three International Chairmen to the UN President, April 1945, in Bussey and Tims, Pioneers for Peace, 177.


38. For example, Ian Welsh, Mobilizing Modernity: The Nuclear Moment (New York: Routledge, 2000), 17–18.


40. Welsh, Mobilizing Modernity, 18.
42. Richmond, Peace in International Relations, 21–39.
43. Richardson, Contending Liberalisms, 2.
44. Richardson, Contending Liberalisms, 9.
45. Latham, Liberal Moment.
47. Richardson, Contending Liberalisms, 20.

CHAPTER 2
2. Following Cecelia Lynch and Audie Klotz, within the label “constructivist” I group a variety of scholars who may differ on ideological and epistemological grounds but who share three common ontological principles: (a) the need for contextualizing the issues under analysis; (b) the belief that the social world is, for some important part, made up of intersubjective understandings; and (c) the insistence on the co-constitution of structure and agency (Klotz and Lynch, Strategies for Research).