

# NPT NEWS IN REVIEW

Civil society perspectives on the  
Eleventh Review Cycle of the Treaty on the  
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)  
27 April–22 May 2026

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Photo: Demonstration at the A-Bomb Dome in Hiroshima on 7 April 2026 © Takeo Nakaoku

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Reaching Critical Will

# Editorial: With an Uncertain Future, We Push for Change

Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

The Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to be held 27 April to 22 May 2026, will be meeting at a time of global war. Over the past few years, tensions and outright armed conflict involving nuclear-armed states have increased. Attacks against nuclear facilities, threats to use nuclear weapons or to resume explosive nuclear testing, expansion and “upgrading” of nuclear arsenals, and nuclear weapon proliferation are all currently underway. Billions of dollars are being **spent** on nuclear weapons each year even as the global economy crumbles under the weight of unlawful, reckless wars that are catastrophically impacting the environment, human rights, the costs of food and fuel, and any remaining semblance of international law or global constraints on violence.

The unprecedented level of militarisation of the planet, led by the United States, has enabled the unfathomable violence we are all now experiencing. And in the midst of it all, nuclear risks are greater than ever. The last remaining **nuclear arms control agreement** between Russia and the United States has expired. **China** and **France** are expanding the size of their nuclear arsenals while India, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and others are continuing with the modernisation of their nuclear weapons, facilities, and delivery systems. European countries are **embarking** upon new **nuclear alliances**, changing their **nuclear doctrines**, or suggesting they might acquire their **own arsenals**. Canada has **announced** it will supply nuclear-armed, non-NPT state party India with uranium. Israel and the US have been **bombing** Iranian nuclear facilities while also waging war, genocide, and imperial aggression against several other countries.

In short, none of the nuclear-armed or their nuclear-supportive allies appear to believe themselves to be bound by international law. Back in 2023, Poland **asserted** that the security of states cannot be diminished in the pursuit of the goals of the NPT. This is now apparently the dominant perspective of states that support nuclear weapons: they see international law as being out of line with their security interests. Law and multilateralism, which are meant to constrain violence, are being abandoned in the pursuit of imperial ambitions. The US government is unabashedly **pursuing** “Manifest Destiny” for the 21st century, recalling an era of violent expansion, colonialism and genocide and applying it to its modern day wars for oil and markets. Even those countries that have defended the so-called rules based order since the end of World War II seem to have **given up** on the pretense of justice or accountability. They appear to only be interested in the survival of their capitalist state systems, bound to the demands of the increasingly intertwined military-technology-industrial complexes and fossil fuel and extractive critical mineral industries.

## The review cycle so far

Within this broader context, this NPT review cycle does not bolster much hope for a successful Review Conference. The 2023 PrepCom **could not agree** to reference the **Chair’s summary** and **recommendations** in the procedural report. Iran, backed by Russia and Syria, blocked the summary from being tabled as a working paper or listed in the procedural reports list of documents because they felt it was biased against Iran and in favour of Western states’ positions. While the burial of a Chair’s summary was a new low point even for the NPT, the defence of the summary was disingenuous as well. The states expressing dismay at the rejection of this paper have killed much more meaningful outcomes from NPT meetings in the past.

The outcome of the 2024 PrepCom was slightly better—the Chair’s summary was listed as a **working paper** in the Committee’s **procedural report**, though Russia insisted on a footnote clarifying that the summary is not a consensus-based document. Still, stark divisions between nuclear and non-nuclear-armed states persisted throughout the meeting. On the final day, some delegations argued that the **revised version** of the summary added undue emphasis to positions that undermine nuclear disarmament and said the **first version** was a more accurate reflection of discussions. The nuclear-armed states, in contrast, seemed happy with the weight given to their positions in the revised text.

In 2025, the PrepCom did not adopt **recommendations** for the RevCon, nor did it adopt the Chair’s **draft decision** on strengthening the NPT review process. As has been the **core problem** throughout the last three NPT review cycles, the nuclear-armed states and their nuclear-complicit allies refuse to implement Article VI and the NPT’s core agenda of nuclear disarmament, and reject any text that holds them those obligations.


Amidst this grim context, some NPT states parties are still trying to do what they can to achieve something. At the 2024 PrepCom, some delegations and civil society groups **pushed** for peer-reviewed reporting mechanisms and interactive dialogues through which the nuclear-armed states would offer increased transparency about their arsenals. While some of the nuclear-armed states expressed openness to such initiatives, it is hard not to see their willingness to participate in transparency initiatives as a disingenuous way to distract from their failure to disarm. Moreover, not all nuclear-armed states are interested in these initiatives at all. Russia argued the suggestions for enhanced transparency are an attempt to “convert the NPT review process into a tool for oversight and coercion,” while China argued that standardised reporting “will strengthen the strategic superiority of some countries to the detriment of the security interests of others.” France, which was previously a proponent of increasing transparency, **announced** earlier this year that it would no longer be **disclosing details** about its nuclear arsenal or doctrine.

### The importance of being earnest

Many are wondering what is achievable at this RevCon—a reaffirmation of past commitments, or of even just the core principles of the Treaty? Will it possible for the nuclear-armed states to even acknowledge the past, let alone make commitments to achieve a better future?

It is essential for this RevCon to reaffirm past outcomes and commitments. It’s also important to agree to an action plan with concrete measures to implement the NPT, particularly Article VI, the implementation of which lags far behind that of the other Treaty’s other provisions.

In the pursuit of these goals, states parties and others participating in this work must be ambitious. Even in the midst of the horrors with which the world is embroiled, we cannot



## 2026 NPT BRIEFING BOOK



allow past failures or current instabilities hold us back from pursuing ambitious goals to make the world safer. History, and the memory of that history, show us what is possible, and what has changed. Even as the nuclear-armed states and their nuclear-supportive allies pursue dominance through violence, they cannot take away the changes that we have collectively achieved in terms of dismantling the narrative of nuclear deterrence, prohibiting nuclear weapons through international law, and raising the perspectives and voices of those previously marginalized in debates and those who have been most harmed by nuclear activities globally.

The antinuclear movement, made up of survivors, organisers, activists, academics, diplomats, and other government or international organisation officials, has been building a new world, a world free of nuclear weapons. The states that are addicted to the power they perceive from the bomb are pushing back, just as the far right in many countries is trying to push back against women's liberation or LGBTQ+ rights or racial equality. Their work is reactionary, not visionary. They are not leading; they are trying to stop justice, accountability, peace, equality. While they might make some gains in their projects, and it might seem like they wield all the power, we need to remember that we created the conditions they are pushing back against. Amidst our despair, we must remember our role—as the ones who create change—and act accordingly. As author and activist Rebecca Solnit **says**, both optimism and pessimism “assume we know the future, and therefore nothing is required from us. I think the future is radically uncertain, and therefore much is required of us.”

## FUNDRAISING APPEAL

**Reaching Critical Will is facing budget cuts that will impact our ability to participate in conferences that we monitor and report on, coordinate civil society activities for, and maintain an archive of statements, working papers, and other documents.**

**We appeal to all delegations and organisations that use our website and reports, or that find our analysis and advocacy useful, to please consider financially supporting the work of Reaching Critical Will.**

**You can use our website to make a one-time or monthly donation, or if you'd like to discuss other options to help sustain our work, please contact us.**

**Thank you to all of our supporters and donors, we couldn't do this work without you!**

# Recommendations from the 2026 NPT Briefing Book

## Reaching Critical Will

*The following recommendations are from RCW's **2026 NPT Briefing Book**. For background information, current context, and analysis of each critical issue, please see the full Briefing Book.*

### **Nuclear disarmament**

- Nuclear-armed states must reiterate their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals—and then must undertake actions necessary to implement this.
- Nuclear-armed and nuclear-implicit states should undertake and report to the NPT PrepCom on actions they have taken to implement Article VI. They should fulfill past NPT commitments on disarmament and achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapon programmes.
- States should raise concerns with the lack of progress in implementing Article VI of the NPT and achieving nuclear disarmament, and must not accept any language in an outcome document that undermines existing disarmament obligations and commitments.
- States should condemn nuclear-armed states' qualitative and quantitative advancement, expansion, or modernisation of their nuclear weapon programmes.
- States should call on nuclear-armed states to undertake nuclear disarmament and cease their modernisation programmes, and for nuclear-implicit states to stop hosting other countries' nuclear weapons on their territories and reject the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on their behalf.
- States should welcome the adoption of the TPNW, call on all states to join the TPNW, and recognise the positive and complementary relationship between the NPT and the TPNW.
- While noting that nuclear arms control is no substitute for nuclear disarmament, Russia and the United States should stick to the limits of New START and restart the Treaty's verification measures while they engage in good faith negotiations to end the arms race and achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons.
- States parties should support efforts for nuclear disarmament verification, including the Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification established by a First Committee resolution last year, but such efforts must not be treated as precondition to nuclear disarmament.

### **Humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons**

- Delegations to the NPT PrepCom should highlight their concerns with the humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons and reiterate that the use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law, including international humanitarian law.
- States should welcome the work undertaken to examine the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and endorse the findings and outcomes of the Oslo, Nayarit, and Vienna conferences.
- Any outcome text produced at the RevCon should take up the language that was agreed in relation to the HINW and the provision of assistance in the unadopted outcome document from the Tenth Review Conference in 2022. In particular, any outcome should reflect the language from 2010

expressing “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons” and reaffirming “the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.” Any text agreed should also reflect language from the TPNW preamble, which recognises “that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.” It should also include the language from the **joint humanitarian statement** of 28 April 2015, endorsed by 159 states, which notes, “It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances.”

- NPT states parties should indicate their interest to contribute financially to victim assistance and environmental remediation for nuclear weapon activities, and should join the TPNW in order to participate fully in the implementation of these TPNW provisions.
- All states should emphasise that the only way to eliminate the risk of nuclear weapon use is to eliminate nuclear weapons, and commit to the immediate abolition of nuclear weapons.
- All states and civil society groups should also acknowledge the humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapon production, maintenance, and modernisation and of the whole nuclear fuel chain (from uranium mining through to radioactive waste disposal), and work to expand commitments related to victim assistance and environmental remediation to include these nuclear weapon activities.
- All states should welcome the establishment of the new UN scientific panel on the effects of nuclear war and commit to participate in or support the panel’s work. They should also support the WHO’s work to update its assessment of the health impacts of nuclear war.
- States should also welcome the research and publications from civil society on this topic, and financially contribute to the continuation of such work.

### **Nuclear weapon spending and modernisation**

- All states possessing nuclear arsenals should halt research, development, testing, production, and modernisation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. They should also declare that they will not design, develop, or produce new nuclear weapons, or modify or modernise existing warheads or delivery systems.
- Non-nuclear armed states should stop providing any material or financial support to public or private companies involved in nuclear weapon production, testing, or modernisation. They should also prohibit such investment by companies or other entities within their jurisdiction. They must not in any way support nuclear weapon modernisation programmes.
- States that include nuclear weapons in their security doctrines should renounce them and withdraw support for any relevant modernisation projects.
- States not possessing nuclear weapons should continue to raise concerns about the threat that the existence of nuclear weapons poses for human security and call on nuclear-armed states to halt all modernisation projects and meet their commitments to nuclear disarmament. They should also continue to highlight that a world free of nuclear weapons can only be achieved if the nuclear-armed states stop modernising their nuclear arsenals.

## Doctrines, transparency, and nuclear sharing

- All states should renounce nuclear deterrence theory and end the inclusion of nuclear weapons in national or alliance doctrines, and/or the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory.
- To this end:
  1. All nuclear-armed states should: a) take steps to eliminate any role for nuclear weapons in their military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies; b) submit plans for doing so; and c) report on the items included in the draft 2015 NPT Review Conference outcome document and the 2026 joint working paper noted above, with a view towards total elimination of nuclear weapons.
  2. All non-nuclear-armed states parties that claim protection from nuclear weapons should: a) eliminate any role for nuclear weapons in their military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies; b) submit plans for doing so; and c) provide details about the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory or the transit of nuclear weapons through their territory.
- All other non-nuclear-armed states should highlight the incompatibility of nuclear sharing and alliance policies and practices with the NPT and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. They should underscore that the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament applies to all NPT states parties, not only to those armed with nuclear weapons. They should also question actions taken by nuclear-armed states that are contrary to the object and purpose of the NPT, including nuclear sharing.
- All non-nuclear-armed states should highlight their security concerns arising from nuclear weapons and articulate their concerns with nuclear deterrence doctrines. They should push for the Review Conference outcome to include clear objections to nuclear deterrence doctrines.
- The RevCon should adopt concrete measures for enhanced transparency and reporting based on the proposals in the working paper from Ireland, New Zealand, and Switzerland noted above.

## Nuclear threats, testing, and risks

- All nuclear-armed states must stop threatening to use nuclear weapons and dismantle their nuclear deterrence doctrines and their nuclear arsenals.
- All nuclear-armed states should cease all forms of nuclear testing, including so-called subcritical tests, and close nuclear test sites and laboratories. All states should sign and ratify the CTBT.
- All states, including the nuclear-armed states, should join the TPNW, which prohibits the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing.
- Delegations should unequivocally condemn any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances.
- Delegations should reaffirm that nuclear deterrence is based on the very existence of nuclear risk; thus, eliminating nuclear risks is a legitimate concern and national responsibility of all states.
- States could outline specific risk reduction measures for nuclear-armed and nuclear-supportive states to undertake but must be clear that these measures do not substitute for nuclear disarmament, using the language from the 2022 NPT Review Conference draft text as outlined above.

- All states must fully respect the prohibition of the placement of nuclear weapons in outer space and refrain from actions or policies that undermine space security.
- Nuclear-armed states must not incorporate artificial intelligence into their nuclear command, control, and communication systems and all other states should support the prohibition and regulation of AI and other emerging technologies in relation to nuclear weapons.
- All delegations should express concern that the incorporation of emerging technologies into nuclear weapon systems heightens the risks of nuclear weapon use by increasing miscalculation, escalation, and loss of control, and should reaffirm that nuclear-armed states must maintain meaningful human control over nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

## Non-proliferation

- States should note that their commitment to non-proliferation is rooted in their concern with the humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons.
- Delegations should emphasise the connection between disarmament and non-proliferation, i.e. that disarmament is the best way to prevent proliferation.
- Delegations should critique nuclear weapon modernisation, arsenal expansions, nuclear sharing, and nuclear threats as acts of proliferation.
- Delegations should highlight the value of nuclear weapon free zone treaties and the TPNW for reinforcing non-proliferation norms and commitments. States should note that the TPNW reaffirms IAEA safeguards system in complete complementarity with the NPT.
- Delegations should encourage all states to adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol, but also express concern that military nuclear materials are not covered by safeguards at all.
- NPT states parties must implement the actions agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference for the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements with the IAEA to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-armed state as no longer required for military purpose, and to make declarations of stockpiles of fissile material that could be used in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The failure of nuclear-armed states to agree to adequate safeguards has created a critical gap in the nuclear non-proliferation architecture. Nuclear-armed states must undertake measures to increase transparency and confidence in the effectiveness of security for military nuclear materials and accept full scope IAEA safeguards on these materials.
- All states should speak out against the comments from any political leaders calling for nuclear proliferation or the spread of nuclear weapons through nuclear sharing or other means.
- NPT states parties must not share nuclear materials, equipment, or technology with non-NPT states parties.
- NPT states parties must cease nuclear alliances and sharing arrangements.
- The US and Israel must immediately halt their attacks on Iran. Israel must also end its strikes against all other countries in the region and its genocide of Palestinians, and the US should draw down its forces and close its military bases in the region.

- All states should speak out against military action against Iran and support diplomatic efforts to prevent further escalation of violence. They must also refuse to provide any financial, material, or logistical support for any attacks on Iran and hold Israel and the United States to account for their unlawful attacks.
- States should call for peaceful approaches and good faith diplomacy to restore and fully implement the JCPOA or an equivalent agreement. Given that previous rounds of negotiations have been cut short by unlawful Israel-US military action against Iran, this will likely require a non-aggression pact to continue in good faith.
- Iran, Israel, and the United States should join the TPNW. Israel should join the NPT. Israel and the US should eliminate their nuclear weapon programmes.
- States should call for peaceful approaches and good faith diplomacy to resolve concerns over the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, including through the pursuit of a peace agreement to formally end the Korean War. A peace agreement would reduce the risk of nuclear war and facilitate talks on disarmament or arms control. It would enable the normalisation of US–DPRK relations, which may help facilitate more effective engagement on denuclearisation by curbing the security risks fueling DPRK's pursuit of nuclear weapons.

### **Middle East weapon of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ)**

- Israel and the United States must immediately end their unlawful war of choice against Iran (see the Non-Proliferation section above for more detailed recommendations on this issue).
- States parties to the NPT should support the UN General Assembly-mandated Conference on the WMDFZ process and welcome it in any outcome documents in this RevCon.
- States from outside the region should approach future talks on the WMDFZ with goodwill to find paths forward, including by hosting non-official roundtables for diplomats and experts from the region. This could help bring all the relevant parties to the table in a constructive way.
- The United States should participate in the UN Conference on the WMDFZ by sending a delegate. Such an engagement will be encouraging for sustaining future talks and is within US obligations as a sponsoring state to the 1995 resolution.
- Efforts toward establishing the WMDFZ should involve further inclusion of civil society.
- NPT states parties should call on Israel, as the only state in the region possessing nuclear weapons, not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, to join the NPT and TPNW, implement IAEA safeguards, and eliminate its nuclear weapon programme. They should also demand Israel comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law by stopping its genocide of Palestinians, occupation of Lebanon, and other crimes in the region. All states must implement the interim orders from the International Court of Justice in this regard, including by ending arms transfers and other material and political support to Israel, and call for an immediate ceasefire and an end to the occupation.

### **AUKUS and nuclear submarines**

- States should negotiate the closure of the Paragraph 14 loophole in the NPT, which could permit non-nuclear states to obtain nuclear-powered submarines and potentially weapons-grade HEU.

- AUKUS members should refrain from sharing the technology and materials necessary for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines.
- Australia must not invest in US and UK nuclear shipbuilding.
- AUKUS members should make firm commitments to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by joining the TPNW.
- Australia must ratify the TPNW urgently in order to comprehensively repudiate nuclear weapons, including extended nuclear deterrence; fulfil the Labor party's long-standing policy commitment to join; and to align Australia with the global majority of countries choosing to reject nuclear weapons.
- Australia must reject nuclear ambiguity and prohibit the entry, transit, or presence of nuclear weapons in Australian territory, waters, and airspace.
- Australia must also end all forms of assistance to nuclear weapon activities, including targeting, command, control, planning, or enabling operations that support the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- All states should condemn and renounce the use of nuclear-powered submarines due to the environmental and health risks that they carry.
- All states should critique the nuclear proliferation risks posed by AUKUS, as well as its broader risks of proliferating militarism, weapon development and production, increasing regional and global tensions and facilitating a new nuclear arms race.

## Nuclear energy

- Delegations should raise concerns with the health, environmental, safety, and security impacts of nuclear power, including in the context of climate change. While the NPT indicates states can use nuclear power, this does not mean it's in the best interest of humanity or the planet.
- Delegations should support the 25 May 2011 **declaration** by the governments of Austria, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, and Portugal, in which they argued that nuclear power is not compatible with the concept of sustainable development and called for energy conservation and a switch to renewable sources of energy world-wide.
- States should also support the February 2011 call from a group of hibakusha for phasing out all sources of radiation—from uranium mining, nuclear reactors, nuclear accidents, nuclear weapons development and testing, and nuclear waste—and for investment in renewable, clean energy for a sustainable future.
- States should commit to working for a sustainable future by reducing the use of energy, investing in renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy, phase out nuclear energy, and not further develop harmful, radioactive technologies.
- Delegations should call on all states that currently use nuclear energy to abide by all nuclear safety and nuclear security instruments and norms and to end the dangerous transshipment of radioactive waste and nuclear materials.
- Delegations should condemn armed conflict and military activities at or near nuclear power facilities and abide by and indicate support for the IAEA General Conference decision on the "Prohibition of armed attack or threat of armed attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under

construction” (GC(53)/ DEC/13). This RevCon should include in its outcome document language reaffirming the prohibition of such attacks.

- States must not engage in armed conflict and military activities at or near nuclear power facilities. Russia should end its war against and occupation of Ukraine, along with the withdrawal of its armed forces from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and other related sites and cease military activities at or near nuclear facilities. Israel and the United States must end their war on Iran and immediately cease any attacks on its nuclear facilities.
- States should provide for assistance, remediation, and reparation for harm caused by all aspects of the nuclear fuel chain.

### **Gender and intersectionality**

- States and organisations must ensure gender diversity on their delegations to NPT meetings. In this context, they need to look beyond the gender binary and take an intersectional approach to participation.
- States should also work to ensure that survivors and those impacted by nuclear weapon production, testing, and use are included in discussions and in the creation of outcome documents.
- Delegations should engage with and support researchers focused on diversifying knowledge about impacts of nuclear weapons, including ionizing radiation but also other harms caused by nuclear weapons production, testing, and use;
- Language in statements and outcome documents should reflect the need for gender diversity, not just the equal representation of the men-women binary. For example, states should call for participation of people of all genders.
- States parties should incorporate intersectional analysis and awareness in their work on the NPT and nuclear disarmament in national policies, practices, and communications on the subject.
- Delegations should consider funding sponsorship programmes to ensure diversity in NPT meetings.
- Any outcome from the RevCon should reinforce previous agreements on the gendered impacts of nuclear weapons and the importance of gender diversity in nuclear discussions and negotiations. Outcomes should build upon this language to also acknowledge and encourage states parties to explore the gendered nature of nuclear weapon discourse and theory and to begin unpacking and un-privileging particular dominant perspectives.
- NPT states parties should make another joint statement that, among other things, calls for the intersections of race, gender, economic status, geography, nationality, and other factors to be taken into account when addressing harms and potential harms caused by nuclear weapons; recommends various ways to address the impacts of nuclear weapons in an intersectional way as well as to diversify participation in work for disarmament and non-proliferation; highlights that for women, non-binary, LGBTQ+ people, Indigenous Peoples, people of colour, and other underrepresented groups, there must not only be a seat at the table, but also real opportunities to shape conversations, policies, and outcomes in relation to nuclear weapons; and recognises that gender norms about masculinity and patriarchal practices such as dismissing the views of non-nuclear-armed states should be acknowledged and challenged.

# WILPF's Disarmament Working Group Brings a Feminist Voice to the NPT Review Conference

WILPF Disarmament Working Group

The Disarmament Working Group of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) has developed a collective statement that will be handed out to delegates and other participants at the upcoming Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Grounded in feminist, pacifist, and antimilitarist principles, the statement raises urgent concerns about escalating global violence, the erosion of international law, and the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament obligations. It highlights the gendered and intersectional impacts of nuclear weapons across their lifecycle, the risks posed by emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, and the structural barriers limiting the participation of Global South voices in disarmament forums. The statement calls on states to fully implement the NPT, advance nuclear disarmament in line with Article VI, and strengthen the global disarmament framework by supporting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Endorsed by multiple WILPF sections, this initiative reflects a growing effort to amplify collective feminist advocacy for a just and nuclear weapons-free world, and to bring the voices of those unable to attend the meeting room to the center. Read the full text in English, Spanish, French, Italian or Portuguese [online](#).

## WILPF Disarmament Working Group Statement to the Eleventh NPT Review Conference

The Disarmament Working Group of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) expresses deep concern about the current global situation marked by escalating violence, armed conflicts, genocide and military aggressions that increasingly disregard international law and multilateral norms. This deterioration does not arise in isolation. It is the consequence of years of selective application of international legal frameworks, that were established precisely to prevent war and protect humanity. Disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control frameworks, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, are central components of this international legal architecture. When international law is weakened, ignored, or violated, the commitments to disarmament and human security are also undermined.

At this critical moment, we call on all States parties to the NPT to recommit to the full implementation of the treaty in all its pillars: you have the responsibility to deliver a world without nuclear weapons to future generations and to protect the current one from the catastrophe of nuclear disasters.

Within the NPT framework, we are troubled by the lack of meaningful progress in recent years. Stalled disarmament efforts both reflect and deepen the broader crisis of declining multilateralism, while risking the



normalisation of inaction and eroding trust in the treaty regime. We are particularly concerned by the development of new types of weapons in some nuclear arsenals and by the possibility that some states might consider withdrawing from the treaty or resuming nuclear weapons explosive testing or allowing proliferation. All of these actions contradict the spirit and obligations of the NPT, including Article VI's commitment to end the nuclear arms race and achieve total nuclear disarmament. At the same time, the integration of artificial intelligence into nuclear command, control, and communication systems, and the growing automation of warfare, introduces additional and **deeply alarming risks**. Delegating life-and-death decisions to automated systems further distances nuclear policy from democratic accountability and human responsibility.

From a feminist, pacifist, and antimilitarist perspective, these developments are particularly alarming. WILPF's grassroots work, together with Reaching Critical Will's advocacy, have consistently demonstrated that militarism, deterrence doctrines, and arms races do not produce security but rather perpetuate structural violence and deepen global inequalities. **Research** has shown that the impacts of nuclear weapons (across their entire lifecycle) are profoundly **gendered**. Uranium mining and nuclear testing disproportionately harm Indigenous Peoples and local communities, particularly in formerly colonised territories. Due to gender, class, race, and other factors, people frequently face unequal access to healthcare, land, and resources when communities are displaced or environments are contaminated. The long-term health effects of radiation, the destruction of livelihoods, and the diversion of public resources toward militarisation instead of social needs all reinforce existing gender inequalities.

These harms are intersectional, shaped by age, race, class, colonial history, and minority status. For these reasons, we call on states not only to meet their obligations under the NPT but also to recognise that nuclear disarmament is a necessary condition for achieving gender justice, environmental protection, and sustainable peace, and therefore to sign and ratify the TPNW, whose structure doesn't limit but complements the NPT.

We are equally concerned about the barriers to meaningful participation in international disarmament forums. Activists, civil society representatives, and scholars — particularly from the Global South, as well as women, youth, and minorities — frequently face visa restrictions and entry risks when attending meetings held in the United States. These barriers undermine inclusivity, legitimacy, and the full implementation of UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. When participation is restricted, discussions risk being dominated by the perspectives of Western states and policy communities, often shaped by militarised security paradigms. This imbalance reproduces historical patterns of exclusion and silencing. It is essential to acknowledge that the regions most affected by nuclear weapons — through testing, uranium extraction, and contamination — are largely those historically subjected to colonial domination, as reflected in the geographical distribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones and their longstanding commitment to universal disarmament.

For this reason, the Disarmament Working Group of WILPF is circulating this collective statement to amplify diverse feminist voices within the NPT process, including those currently affected by armed conflict. We believe the experiences, knowledge, and leadership of women and nuclear-affected communities must be central to international discussions on disarmament and human-centered security.

At this critical moment, we call on all states gathered at the NPT Review Conference to act with courage and responsibility, and to:

- Fulfill their obligations under all articles of the NPT, especially Article VI;
- Recognize nuclear disarmament as a necessary condition for gender justice, environmental protection, and sustainable peace;

- Ensure that voices from the Global South and affected communities are centred in any credible discussion on nuclear justice;
- Reaffirm their commitment to the NPT across all its pillars, and their responsibility to deliver a nuclear-weapons-free world to future generations;
- Sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and start adhering to it.

Finally, we call on the nuclear states to adopt policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons as soon as possible.

The continued existence of nuclear weapons is incompatible with a world based on peace, sustainability of life, global justice, equality, and care for people and the planet. Feminist peace movements have long demonstrated that security for people and for the planet cannot be built through deterrence, domination, or the threat of annihilation. Instead it must be grounded in cooperation, human rights, environmental sustainability, and the dismantling of the global military enterprise.

Signed by: WILPF Brasil, WILPF Canada, LIMPAL Colombia, WILPF Spain, WILPF Italy, WILPF Ghana, WILPF UK, WILPF Germany, WILPF US, WILPF Austria, WILPF Australia

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## Mayors for Peace Youth Forum



**APRIL 28, 2026**  
**10:30 AM - 12:00 PM**

Conference Room A  
in UNHQ 



Mayors for Peace Youth

## Mayors for Peace Events in UNHQ

SIDE EVENT

Taking Stock of the NPT:  
Achievements, Persistent  
Challenges, and Emerging  
Opportunities



-Wednesday, 29 April  
10:15 AM-11:45 AM-

Amid today's "disarmament winter," this event looks beyond a Final Document to highlight the Review Process as a platform for dialogue. It revisits the NPT's three pillars and Grand Bargain to reflect on key challenges and future relevance.



EXHIBITION OF "PEACEFUL  
TOWNS" CHILDREN'S ARTWORK

This exhibition showcases 20 award-winning works from our 2025 Children's Art Competition. Enjoy these heartfelt artworks created by children from member cities around the world.

-April 27 to May 8 -



VR EXPERIENCE: DEVASTATION OF  
THE HIROSHIMA ATOMIC BOMBING

This VR headset with a 5-minute, 360-degree video allows users to virtually experience the devastation inflicted by the Hiroshima atomic bombing.

-April 27 to May 1-

# No Nuclear Weapons in Australia

ICAN Australia

The movement to keep Australia nuclear weapons-free has reached a critical point. The planned hosting of US nuclear-capable B-52 bombers and potentially nuclear-armed submarines under the AUKUS agreement significantly increases the danger of a catastrophic nuclear accident occurring on Australian soil and makes Australia a potential target for adversaries.

Against these developments, and as renewed global threats push the risk of nuclear conflict to its highest level in decades, ICAN Australia invited Australian and Pacific Islands civil society organisations to join the “**No Nuclear Weapons in Australia Declaration**”. With over 150 organisations signing on, this declaration sends a clear message to Australia to end all forms of assistance to nuclear weapons activities and not lose its nuclear weapons-free status. The legacy of nuclear testing in Australia and the Pacific is one of profound and ongoing harm and underscores the imperative to ensure Australia never again contributes to nuclear violence.

The principal concerns in the declaration are:

- **Nuclear hosting:** Australia’s deepening military integration under AUKUS risks making Australia a launchpad for nuclear war—through hosting nuclear-capable B-52s in the Northern Territory, US attack submarines that may become nuclear-capable, and expanding support for allies’ nuclear command, targeting and planning.
- **Nuclear ambiguity:** Australia has no legal ban on nuclear weapons entering or being launched from Australian territory and accepts allies’ “neither confirm nor deny” policies. This secrecy and complicity are unacceptable—Australia has the right to know, and the right to say no.
- **Acting against international law:** These actions contradict Australia’s obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ) and are inconsistent with international humanitarian law.

The Declaration calls on the Australian government to draw a red line on nuclear weapons:

- **Sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)** as a matter of urgency.
- **Reject nuclear ambiguity** and prohibit the entry, transit or presence of nuclear weapons in Australian territory, waters and airspace.
- **End all forms of assistance to nuclear weapons activities**, including targeting, command, control, planning or enabling operations that support the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Groups representing millions of people—from the peace and disarmament, environment, union, health, religious, legal, human rights, humanitarian, Pacific, Indigenous and First Nations, research and policy, education and youth sectors—have endorsed the call. Central to this declaration is a collective demand for Australia to uphold the spirit and letter of the Rarotonga Treaty. As a founding signatory to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, Australia has a permanent obligation to ensure our region remains shielded from the existential threat of nuclear weapons and the horror of renewed testing.

Australia is the only US-aligned state whose governing party has formally committed to sign and ratify the TPNW. There is both a window of opportunity and an urgent need to shift course. Australia must move away from reliance on, and complicity in, nuclear weapons, and towards a defence posture that is sovereign, transparent, and consistent with humanitarian law.

At the NPT Review Conference, Australia has a rare opportunity to demonstrate genuine leadership on disarmament, not merely as a non-nuclear state, but as a US ally willing to act on its commitments and help advance global nuclear disarmament efforts.



Photo © ICAN Australia

# Mobilizing Scientific Communities to Advance Nuclear Disarmament

## NPT Review Conference side event

Monday 4 May, 13:00-15:00  
Conference Room A  
UN Headquarters

"Tremendous progress has been made in reducing global nuclear stockpiles and nuclear risks, but we are now heading in the wrong direction...There is no greater obligation than to prevent the catastrophe of nuclear war." - **Nobel Laureate Assembly for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 2025 (signed by 129 Nobel Laureates)**



## Cosponsors:

Austria, Brazil, Mexico, New Zealand, and Princeton University Program on Science and Global Security

"Scientists can work to educate each other, especially the next generation, and the public and policy makers on the risks posed by nuclear weapons arsenals and policies; and expand the role of science for disarmament, conflict resolution and peace and as a bridge between states and societies globally." - **Scientific Advisory Group for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 2025**

This event will feature presentations by scientists and nuclear policy specialists on how scientists understand today's nuclear challenges, what is being done to address them, and what more is needed from scientists, governments, and the public.

Global processes to address nuclear dangers need to be more representative, better informed, more publicly accessible, and more collaborative. This requires advancing the roles of the global scientific community, especially from the Global South, in efforts to reduce and end nuclear dangers, and especially in developing and communicating the understanding of the catastrophic effects of nuclear warfare.

## SPEAKERS

**Frank von Hippel:** Co-founder in 1974 of Princeton University's Program on Science & Global Security, and author of "Ending the Nuclear Arms Race: A Physicist's Quest" (2024).

**Stewart Prager:** Co-founder of the Physicists Coalition for Nuclear Threat Reduction, and professor emeritus of astrophysical sciences at Princeton University.

**Sébastien Philippe:** Assistant professor University of Wisconsin-Madison, visiting researcher Princeton Program on Science and Global Security, and member UN Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War.

**Zia Mian:** Co-director, Princeton University Program on Science & Global Security, and co-chair of the Scientific Advisory Group of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

**Leyatt Betre:** Independent researcher for the project "Mobilizing Scientific Communities on the Effects of Nuclear War and Nuclear Disarmament" and research collaborator, Princeton University Program on Science & Global Security.

**Tamara Patton:** Independent researcher for the project "Mobilizing Scientific Communities on the Effects of Nuclear War and Nuclear Disarmament" and research collaborator, Princeton University Program on Science & Global Security.

Scan below for an introductory resource guide on the global environmental effects of nuclear war. This **living resource** is being developed by Princeton SGS to support and expand scientific engagement.



# NPT NEWS IN REVIEW

Reaching Critical Will (RCW) is a project founded in 1999 to coordinate and enhance the engagement of activists and organisers in the work for disarmament at the United Nations.

RCW works for disarmament and the prohibition of many different weapon systems; confronting militarism and military spending; and exposing gendered aspects of the impact of weapons and disarmament processes with a feminist lens.

RCW also monitors and analyses international disarmament processes, providing primary resources, reporting, and civil society coordination at various UN-related forums.

The *NPT News in Review* is produced by Reaching Critical Will. The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of RCW.

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Reaching Critical Will